Program build information, such as compilers and libraries used, is vitally important in an auditing and benchmarking framework for High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems. I have developed a tool to automatically extract this information using signature-based detection, a common strategy employed by anti-virus software to search for known patterns of data within the program binaries. I formulate the patterns from various "features" embedded in the program binaries, and the experiment shows that my tool can successfully identify many different compilers, libraries, and their versions.
Moreover, as mentioned in [15] , there is an increasing interest from funding bodies such as National Science Foundation in software and library usage on HPC systems they financed. This information can gauge how well the HPC resources are meeting their funding initiatives and scientific goals. From the perspectives of system administrators, the program build information can also help determine which compilers and libraries are rarely used and hence safe to retire.
However, in most HPC systems, program build information, if maintained at all, is recorded manually by system administrators. Over time, the sheer number of software/library packages of different versions, builds, and compilers of choice can grow exponentially and become too daunting and burdensome to document. For example, on University at Buffalo's supercomputer "Edge" there are software packages built from 250 combinations of different compilers and numerical/MPI libraries. On larger systems such as Jaguar and Kraken at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the number can be as high as 738 [15] .
In addition, there is no standard format of documenting program build information. Many HPC systems use Modules [2] or SoftEnv [5] to manage software packages, and a common naming scheme is to incorporate the compiler name (as a suffix) in the package name. There is usually additional textual description to indicate build information, such as compiler version, debug/optimization/profiling build, and so on. Mining these free-form texts, however, requires the understanding of each HPC site's software environment and documentation style and is not generally applicable.
In this paper, I present a signature-matching approach to automatically uncover the program build information. This approach is akin to the common strategy employed by antivirus software to detect malware: search for a set of known signatures. I exploit the following "features" of program binaries and create signatures out of them:
• Compiler-specific code snippets.
• Compiler-specific meta data.
• Library code snippets.
• Symbol versioning.
• Checksums.
My approach has several advantages. First, I only need to create, annotate, and maintain a database of signatures gathered from compilers and libraries, and I can then run the signature scanner over program binaries to derive their build information. Second, unlike the anti-virus industry where the malware code must be identified and extracted by experts, my signature collection process is almost mechanical and can be performed by non-experts. Third, my approach does not rely on symbolic information and thus can handle stripped program binaries.
My implementation is based on the advanced pattern matching engine of ClamAV [19] , an open-source anti-virus package. I choose ClamAV for its open-source nature, signature expressiveness and scanning speed.
The remainder of this paper begins by describing the features in the program binaries. Section 3-4 provide the implementation details and experimental results. I then discuss potential improvement and related work in §5-6, followed by conclusion in §7.
PROGRAM BINARY CHARACTERISTICS
On most modern UNIX and UNIX-related systems, the executable binaries (programs and libraries) are stored in a standard object file format called the Executable and Linking Format (ELF) [27, 7] . An ELF file can be divided into named "sections," each of which serves a specific function at compile time or runtime. The sections relevant to my work are:
• .text section contains the executable machine code and is the main source for my signature identification.
• .comment section contains compiler and linker specific version control information. More on this in §2.2.
• .dynamic section holds dynamic linking information, including file names of dependent dynamic libraries, and pointers to symbol version tables and relocation tables.
• .rel.text and .rela.text sections consist of relocation tables associated with the corresponding .text sections. More details in §3.2.
• .gnu.version_d section comprises the version definition table. More on this in §2.4.
There is a wealth of information embedded in these sections, and in the following I explain these characteristics in detail.
Compiler-Specific Code Snippets
It is not news that certain popular compilers on the Intel x86 platform insert extra code snippets unbeknownst to the developers [12] . I will illustrate with three examples.
The first example is the so-called "processor dispatch" employed by certain optimizing compilers. As the x86 architecture evolves with the addition of new capabilities and new instructions such as Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) and Advanced Vector eXtensions (AVX), an optimizing compiler will produce machine code tuned for each capability. Since the new instructions are not recognized by older generations of x86 processors, to avoid "illegal instruction" errors and to re-route the execution path to the suitable code blocks, an extra code snippet is inserted to perform this task.
Both Intel and PGI compilers, when invoked with optimization flags enabled (and -O2 is used implicitly), insert the processor dispatch code which is executed before the application's main function. These code snippets invariably use the cpuid instruction to obtain processor feature flags. For example, the core processor dispatch routine used by the Intel compiler is called __intel_cpu_indicator_init. It initializes an internal variable called __intel_cpu_indicator to different values based on the processor on which the program is running [12] . This information is later used to either abort program execution immediately, with an error like "This program was not built to run on the processor in your system," or execute different code blocks (tuned for different generations of SSE instructions) in Intel's optimized C library routines such as memcpy and strcmp.
A second instance of compiler-inserted code is to enable or disable certain floating-point unit (FPU) features. For example, when GCC is invoked with -ffast-math or -funsafemath-optimizations optimization flags, it inserts code to turn on the Flush-To-Zero (FTZ) mode and the DenormalsAre-Zero (DAZ) mode in the x86 control register MXCSR. When these modes are on, the FPU bypasses IEEE 754 standards and treats denormal numbers, i.e. values extremely close to zero, as zeros. This optimization trades off accuracy for speed [11] . The GCC also accepts -mpc{32|64|80} flags, which are used to set the legacy x87 FPU precision/rounding mode. Again, GCC uses a special prolog code to configure the FPU to the requested mode.
A third instance of compiler-inserted code is to initialize user's data. For example, one of the C++ language features requires that static objects must be initialized, i.e. their constructors must be called, before program startup [6] . To implement this, the C++ compiler emits a special ELF section called .ctors, which is an array of pointers to static objects' constructors, and inserts a prolog code snippet which sweeps through the .ctors section before running the application's main function.
Compiler-Specific Meta Data
ELF files have an optional section called .comment which consists of a sequence of null-terminated ASCII strings. This section is not loaded into memory during execution and its primary use is a placeholder for version control software such as CVS or SVN to store control keyword information. In practice, most compilers I examined will also fill this section with strings which are unique enough to differentiate the compilers and the versions (see §4.1). The compiler adds string data by using the .ident assembler directive when generating the assembly code, and then the assembler pools these strings and saves them into the .comment section. Unlike the debugging and symbolic information embedded in other ELF sections, the .comment section is not removed by the GNU strip utility, so I can mine it to obtain the compiler provenance.
For example, using the GNU readelf tool with commandline option -p .comment on GCC-compiled programs could have the following output: 
Library Code Snippets
If a program calls library functions, the linker will bind the functions to libraries to create the executable. The linking mode is either static or dynamic. In the former, the linker extracts the code of called functions from libraries, which are simply archives of ELF files, and performs the relocation (see §3.2) to merge the user's code and the library functions code into a single executable. In the latter, the linker does not use any code from the libraries, but instead creates proxy/stub code which can locate the entry point of each called library function at runtime. Static linking, although it has drawbacks such as code duplication and is no longer the default mode of linking on most platforms, is still used in cases where dynamic linking is problematic. For example, unlike C, C++ and Fortran do not have an agreed API and ABI (application binary interface), so not only object files created by different C++/Fortran compilers can seldom be linked together, object files created by different versions of the same compiler are not guaranteed to interoperate either [25, 1] . For this reason, Fortran compilers in particular, tend to use static linking. It is also not uncommon for independent software vendors (ISVs) to ship only statically linked binaries to avoid portability and library dependency issues.
On some platforms where the operating system is designed to be simple and efficient, e.g. Cray XT's Catamount and IBM Blue Gene/L's Compute Node Kernel (CNK), dynamic linking is usually not an option and static linking has to be used [17] .
A third case for static linking is the aforementioned compilerspecific code snippets. They exist as object files or libraries and are almost always statically linked.
For all of the above reasons, library code snippets are the most important source of signatures in my program build discovery tool.
Symbol Versioning
Some dynamic libraries are self-annotated with version information in a uniform format, and I use this information to identify both the library and its version.
As mentioned in §2.3, dynamic linking has the issue of interoperability. Historically, this was partly solved by having unique file names for the dynamic libraries. The file names usually incorporate major and minor release numbers, such as lib<name>.so.<major>.<minor>. The linker will then record the exact file names in the resulting binaries' .dynamic section. In 1995 Sun introduced a new and fine-grained versioning mechanism in Solaris 2.5, which the GNU/Linux community soon adopted [9] . In this scheme, each function name and symbol can be associated with a version, and at the library level, a chain of version compatibility can be specified. The version of the library is then the highest version in the version chain.
As an example, in the GNU C runtime library (glibc) source tree, one can find version definition scripts containing the following
The left-hand side specifies that malloc and free are versioned GLIBC 2.0 and malloc_info GLIBC 2.10. The right-hand side indicates GLIBC 2.10 is compatible with GLIBC 2.1, which is compatible with GLIBC 2.0. All of the versioning data are encoded in the .gnu.version_d section (d for definition) of dynamic libraries when they are built.
When a user program is compiled and linked, a versionaware linker obtains versions of called functions from the dynamic libraries and stores them in the resulting binaries' .gnu.version_r section (r for reference). At runtime, the program loader-linker ld.so first examines whether all version references in the user's program binary can be satisfied or not, and determines to either abort or continue.
Symbol versioning is used extensively in the GNU compiler collection (C, C++, Fortran, and OpenMP runtime libraries), Myrinet MX / DAPL libraries, and OpenFabrics / InfiniBand Verbs libraries. All of these instances adopt the same version naming scheme: a unique label, e.g. GLIBC, GLIBCXX, or MX, followed by an underscore and the version. Hence, my tool can recognize them using a hard-coded list of labels and obtain their version by traversing the version chain.
Checksums
Most dynamic libraries are less sophisticated and do not use symbol versioning. Therefore, to recognize them, I resort to the traditional approach of checksums. Md5sum is a commonly used open-source utility to produce and verify the MD5 checksum of a file, but it is file-structure agnostic and fails to characterize ELF dynamic libraries on platforms (e.g. Red Hat Enterprise Linux) where the prelinking/prebinding technology [16] is used. Prelinking is intended to speed up the runtime loading and linking of dynamic libraries when a program binary is launched. To achieve this, a daemon process will periodically update the dynamic libraries' relocation table. The side effect of prelinking is MD5 checksum mismatch, as part of the file content has been changed. To defeat this effect, I calculate the MD5 checksum over the .text section only for ELF files.
IMPLEMENTATION
My implementation is based on the pattern matching engine of the open-source anti-virus package ClamAV [19] , with additional code to support symbol versioning. The implementation comprises two tools: a signature generator and a signature scanner. The signature generator parses ELF files and outputs ClamAV-formatted signature files. The signature scanner takes as input the signature files and the user's program binary and outputs all possible matches. In the following, I discuss ClamAV's signature formats and matching algorithms and how I leverage ClamAV in my implementation.
ClamAV Design
ClamAV signatures can be classified as one of the following types, in the order of increasing complexity and power: MD5, basic, regular expression (regex), logical, and bytecode. My implementation makes use of the first three types because they can be generated automatically (see §3.2).
A basic signature is a hexadecimal string. ClamAV's scanning engine handles this type of signature with a modified version of the classical Boyer-Moore string searching algorithm called Wu-Manber. The basic idea of BM algorithm is to preprocess the signature string to create a linear array of integers ("shift table"). This per-signature table determines how many bytes in the target buffer to skip over when there is a byte mismatch. Wu-Manber extends the BM algorithm to allow efficiently matching against a large number of signatures.
A regex signature is a basic signature with wildcards. My implementation use two kinds of wildcards extensively: ?? (to match any byte) and {n} (to match any consecutive n bytes). ClamAV's scanning engine handles regex signatures with the Aho-Corasick (AC) string searching algorithm, which can match multiple strings concurrently at the cost of consuming more memory. The AC algorithm starts with a preprocessing phase: Take a set of wildcardfree strings to create a finite automaton. The scanning phase is simply a series of state transitions in this finite automaton. ClamAV utilizes the AC algorithm as follows: Every regex signature is broken into basic signatures (separated by wildcards), and a single finite automaton (implemented as a two-level 256-way "trie" data structure) is created from all of these basic signatures. If all wildcard-free parts of a regex signature are matched, ClamAV checks whether the order and the gaps between the parts satisfy the specified wildcards.
For completeness I briefly mention the remaining two signature types. I do not use them because I do not yet find automatic ways to create them. Logical signatures allow combining of multiple regex signatures using logical and arithmetic operators. A logical signature can specify, for example, there must be at least five matches of any of regex #1, regex #2, and regex #3, and among the matches, there must be exactly two different regexes.
Bytecode signatures further extend logical signatures and offer the maximal flexibility. Bytecode signatures are actually ClamAV plug-ins compiled from C programs into LLVM bytecodes, and hence allow arbitrary algorithmic detections of patterns.
Signature Generator
For dynamic libraries (.so files), the signature generator computes the MD5 checksums over their .text sections and outputs the ClamAV-conformant MD5 signature files.
Compiler-specific code snippets and static library code reside in ELF .o (object) and .a (library archive) files. In the following discussions I only focus on .o file handling because an .a file is just an archive of multiple .o files. My signature generator extracts .text sections from .o files, and outputs, for each .text section, a basic or regex signature of 16-255 bytes length (excluding the wildcards.) I describe this process in depth as follows.
First, a signature is not just bytes from the .text section verbatim. When a source file is compiled into an .o file, the addresses of unresolved function names and symbols in this .o file are unknown and have to be left empty. It is during the linking phase that these addresses are resolved and assigned by the linker. This process is called relocation [20] . To facilitate the relocation, the compiler emits one relocation table for each .text section. Each entry of a relocation table specifies the symbol name to be resolved, the offset into the .text section which contains the address to be assigned, and the relocation type. When I create a signature from the bytes of a .text section, I have to mask the bytes which are reserved for addresses yet to be computed. To illustrate, suppose that I compile the following source code into an .o file: #include <stdlib.h> void foo() { char *buf = malloc(10); } On x86, the disassembly of the generated .o file would be (using the GNU objdump utility): OFFSET TYPE VALUE 00000e R_X86_64_PC32 malloc+0xffffffff fffffffc Together, the above examples illustrate that the target of the callq instruction should be the address of a function named "malloc", and the address should fill the 4 bytes (as specified by the R_X86_64_PC32 relocation type) starting at offset 0xe (the boxed 00's). So if foo, as a library function, is used to create a user program binary, the linker will take the byte stream 55 48 89 e5 . . . c9 c3 and fill the bytes at offset 0xe through 0xe+3 with the actual address of malloc. Thus, to identify foo, I create a ClamAV regex signature as: The second consideration is the signature size. As will be seen in §4.2 a .text section can be as big as four megabytes. Using the entire .text section could lead to long preprocessing time and large disk/memory storage space. Therefore, I impose an upper limit on the signature size to be 255 bytes. I think 255 is a reasonable size, as there are 256 255 possible distinct 256-byte streams, which is large enough to have few collisions/false positives. For a .text section of n > 256 bytes, I use the tailing 255/3=85 bytes x1x2 . . . x85 of the first third portion, the tailing 85 bytes y1y2 . . . y85 of the middle third, and the tailing 85 bytes z1z2 . . . z85 of the last third, and form a regex signature as: x1x2 . . . x85 {l} y1y2 . . . y85 {m} z1z2 . . . z85
where l = n/3 −85 and m = l +(n%3). I also ignore .text sections which are shorter than 16 bytes. This cut-off is chosen because the size of an x86 instruction varies between 1 and 16 bytes, and since I do not decode the bytes back to x86 instructions, I do not know the instruction boundaries and have to make a conservative assumption. Besides, signatures that are too short could result in many false positives.
The third consideration is an .o file could contain more than one .text section. This happens in GNU Fortran's static library, which is created with the -ffunction-sections compiler flag. This flag instructs the compiler to put each function in its own .text section instead of all functions from the same source file in one single .text section. So for a Fortran function, say foo, the compiler creates a section named .text.foo which consists of foo's code only 1 My tool always emits one signature for one .text section, so in this case, there would be multiple signatures for one .o file.
Signature Scanner
The signature database is organized as a collection of signature files, each of which contain signatures from a specific compiler/library, e.g. Intel Fortran compiler, Intel MKL, MVAPICH, etc. Each signature file is annotated manually to indicate the package name and version. The scanner takes as input this database and the user's program binary and outputs all possible matches. For dynamic library identification, it uses the ldd command to obtain the library pathnames. It then extracts their symbol versioning data (if there is any) and compares against a list of known labels, as explained in §2.4. For those without symbol versioning, the scanner checks their MD5 checksums against those in the database.
For compiler and static library identification, the scanner loads the program binary's .text and .comment sections (compiler meta-data are treated as basic signatures) and runs them through the ClamAV matching engine. By default ClamAV stops as soon as it spots a match, so to find all matches, I modify it by repeatedly zeroing out the matched area and rerunning the engine, until no match can be found.
EVALUATION
I evaluate my approach with both toy programs and realworld HPC software packages from two HPC sites. I compile toy programs with a variety of compilers to test the effectiveness of source compiler identification. I use the existing HPC software packages to assess not only the compiler and library recognition but also ClamAV's scanning performance.
Compiler Identification
I examine fourteen compilers on the x86-64 Linux platform and I summarize our findings in Table 1 . I locate the compiler-specific code snippets by enabling the verbosity flag in building the toy programs. This flag is supported by all compilers and it can display exactly where and which .a and .o files are used in the compilation process. I then run my signature generating tool on these .a and .o files to create the signature database. The time to create such a database is very fast: The largest .a file (210 MB) I have ever encountered is libmkl_core.a in Intel MKL 10.3.1 and it takes 28 seconds (78% of this time is spent in I/O) to create its signature file.
The toy programs I constructed, e.g. "Hello, World" and matrix multiplication, are short and use only basic language features and APIs, so they can highlight the usefulness of my approach. All test cases are compiled with each compilers' default settings.
As an example, the "Hello, World" program compiled with Intel compiler 12.0 yields the following output from my scanner. It gives the number of matches and total size of matches against each signature file: I have the following observations. 1. Many compilers strive to be compatible with the GNU development tools and runtime environment, so they also use GNU's code snippets. Therefore, GCC becomes a common denominator and is ubiquitous in the scanning results. The above output is typical: The Intel compiler locates the system's default GCC installation (version 4.4.3 in this case) and uses its The matches include both the Fortran runtime library and compiler-specific code snippets, which are shared by C/C++ and Fortran compilers. The result also implies that PGI reuses a significant amount of code across each release. I scrutinized the code snippets which match both versions 7.x and 11.x and found their functionality includes memory operations (allocate, copy, zero, set), I/O setup (open, close), command-line argc/argv handling, etc.
4. Compilers which share codebase are not easily distinguishable. Examples include Open64 and PathScale, GNU and LLVM-GCC, etc. In these cases, only the compilerspecific meta data can tell them apart, and Clang in particular is the only compiler which defies my inference efforts; Clang has neither compiler-specific code snippets nor compiler-specific meta data as mentioned in §2.1-2.2.
Library Identification
I applied the scanner to a subset of HPC applications (Amber [10] , Charmm [8] , CPMD [3], GAMESS [24] , Lammps [22] , NAMD [21] , NWChem [26] , PWscf [14] ) available on two HPC sites (a 3456-core Intel-based commodity PC cluster at University at Buffalo and a 672-core Cray XT5m system at Indiana University). I gathered signatures from numerical and MPI libraries which I know have been linked statically in the application builds. The libraries and the size of their constituent .o files are summarized in Table 2 For the test I create a signature database exclusively from the aforementioned libraries. It has 100K signatures and the predominant signature type is regex. The 21 HPC application binaries under test have a mean code size of 13.3 MB and the largest is NWChem 6.0 on Cray (39.4 MB, mainly due to static linking, as in §2.3). I build the (singlethreaded) scanner with Intel compiler 12.0 and I run the scan on a 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon L5420 "Harpertown" node and a 2.8 GHz X5560 "Nehalem" node. The results show that the scanner can correctly identify all used libraries. The scanning time t (in seconds) can be best described by the linear regressions t = −1.11 + 7.23x (Harpertown) and t = −5.44+6.98x (Nehalem) where x is the code size in MB, and the peak memory usage is 195 MB.
DISCUSSION
My methodology of identifying the source compiler depends on the idiosyncrasies of the x86 platform and compilers. I also explored the two major compilers, GCC and IBM XL, on the PowerPC platform, and did not find discernible compiler-specific code snippets. IBM XL compilers do inscribe their brand strings in the .comment section, but in general, content in .comment section is subject to tampering. For example, the following line in a C program:
__asm__(".ident \"foo\"");
will emit "foo" to the .comment section. This makes .comment section a less reliable source of compiler provenance from a general perspective of software forensics.
Another issue is that a compiler inserts its characteristic prolog code only when it is compiling the source file which contains the main function. So if different source files are compiled with different compilers, the resulting program binary could lack the compiler-specific code snippets one would expect. In addition, in Intel compiler's case, it does not insert processor-dispatch code if the optimization is turned off either explicitly (with -O0) or implicitly (e.g. with -g).
My approach cannot discover the compilation flags used in the program build process. Some compilers offer a switch to record the command-line options inside either .comment or other sections. For example, Intel has -sox, GCC has -frecord-gcc-switches (recorded in .GCC.command.line section), and Open64 / PathScale and Absoft do it by default. I expect this self-annotation feature to be more widely embraced by compiler developers, as they move toward better compatibility with GCC, and used by HPC programmers, as it greatly aids debugging and performance analysis.
As demonstrated in §4.1, my scanner shows all possible matches, ranked by the number of signatures matched from each compiler / library. I choose to list all matches instead of merely showing the top one because unlike virus signature databases, ours is generated automatically from software packages which reuse significant amount of code from their prior versions. It is possible to reduce the scanner output's ambiguity by manually identifying those signatures unique to each version of each package, but this process would require expert knowledge and is labor intensive.
RELATED WORK
ALTD [15] is an effort to track software and library usage at HPC sites. It takes a proactive approach by intercepting and recording every invocation of the linker and the job scheduler. My work is complementary in that it performs post-mortem analysis and works on systems without ALTD.
The work by Rosenblum and co. [23] is the first attempt to infer the compiler provenance. They used sophisticated machine learning by modeling and classifying the code byte stream as a linear chain Conditional Random Field. As in most supervised learning systems, a lengthy training phase is required: They first prepare several dozens of program binaries created from different compilers (in their work, GCC, Intel compiler, and MS Visual Studio were chosen), label their respective compiler origins, and use them to train the model. The training uses a global optimization package to compute the model parameters. The resulting system can then infer the source compiler with a probability.
Rosenblum and co.'s approach has several drawbacks, which my method addresses: They focus solely on executable code and ignores other parts of ELF files. The preprocessing/training phase, albeit one-time, is slow and complex, and worse yet, the model parameters cannot be updated incrementally with ease when a new compiler is added. It is also unclear if their model can discern the nuances among different versions of the same compiler. On the other hand, my approach is straightforward regular expression matching, which makes it possible to choose from numerous high-quality matching engine implementations and to give users the liberty to add or remove regular expression patterns.
Kim's approach [18] is closest to ours in spirit, but it misses the key feature in my implementation: the relocation table. It produces a signature by copying the first 25 bytes of a library function code verbatim. With such a short signature and lack of relocation information, his tool has very limited success in identifying library code snippets.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Compilers and libraries provenance reporting is crucial in an auditing and benchmarking framework for HPC systems. In this paper I present a simple and effective way to mine this information via signature matching. I also demonstrate that building and updating a signature database is straightforward and needs no expert knowledge. Finally, my tests show excellent scanning speed even on very large program binaries.
I would extend my work as follows. I used wildcard characters in the signatures (see §3.2) because they fit nicely into the regular expression patterns. In reality they are not arbitrary values but are addresses of target function calls. Thus, to improve the precision, it should also involve the look-up of the target function calls' addresses. In addition, as discussed in §5, my current implementation shows all possible matches because the signature database is generated automatically. More efforts should be invested in manually filtering out those signatures shared among different compilers, versions of compilers, and libraries, so the tool will only give a single match instead of several possibilities.
